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‘The central task of a natural science is to make the wonderful commonplace: to show that 
complexity, correctly viewed, is only a mask for simplicity; to find pattern hidden in 
apparent chaos. … 
… 
This is the task of natural science: to show that the wonderful is not incomprehensible, to 
show how it can be comprehended – but not to destroy wonder. For when we have 
explained the wonderful, unmasked the hidden pattern, a new wonder arises at how 
complexity was woven out of simplicity. The aesthetics of natural science and mathematics 
is at one with the aesthetics of music and painting – both inhere in the discovery of a 
partially concealed pattern.’ 
 
Herbert Simon, 1996, pp. 1-2. 
 
                                                            
♠ An earlier, more concise, version of this paper was prepared for the Handbook of the History of 
Economic Analysis, edited by Gilbert Faccarello & Heinz Kurz, Edward Elgar Publishing.  
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ADVENTURES OF AN ARTIFICED LIFE 
No other single person has won the Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics (in 1978), the 
Turing Award of the Association for Computing Machinery (shared with Allen Newell, in 
1975), the Orsa/ Tims John von Neumann Theory Prize in 1988), the Distinguished Scientific 
Contribution Award of the American Psychological Association in 1969 and the National 
Medal of Science in 1986.  
In a virtuoso academic life and career spanning more than six decades, Simon managed, 
almost single-handedly, to create the wholly new disciplines of behavioural economics and 
the cognitive sciences and nurture through to growth and prosperity one of the great academic 
institutions, the Graduate School of Industrial Administration (GSIA) at the Carnegie 
Institute of Technology (now the Carnegie Mellon University) in Pittsburgh, where these 
disciplines challenged orthodoxies with the pugnacious visions and solid theoretical and 
experimental foundations that had been provided by their courageous and visionary creator
1. 
Herbert Simon was the second son of Arthur Carl Simon, a German émigré electrical 
engineer, inventor and patent lawyer, and Edna Marguerite Merkel, pianist and a second-
generation descendant of immigrants from Prague and Cologne. He was wholly Jewish on his 
father's side; partly Lutheran on his mother's. His brother Clarence was five years older. He 
was introduced to Dorothea Isabel Pye by William W Cooper






















day in 1937. Their daughter Kathie was born in 1942, followed by son Peter in 1944 and 
another daughter Barbara in 1946. 
From the public elementary and high schools in Milwaukee, he won a full scholarship ($300 
per year) to the University of Chicago, taking the exam in Physics, Mathematics and English. 
An early intellectual influence was his maternal uncle Harold Merkel, "an ardent formal 
debater [whom] I followed in that activity too", who had died young, at the age of 30, in 
1922. Uncle Harold had graduated with distinction in Law from the University of Wisconsin, 
having also studied economics under the legendary John R. Commons and leaving behind 
copies of The Federalist Papers and William James's Psychology in the family library, both of 
which were devoured by the young Herbert, leaving indelible impressions on the future civil 
libertarian, behavioural economist, computer scientist and cognitive psychologist. His first 
publication, whilst still in grade school, was a letter to the Editor of the Milwaukee Journal, 
defending atheism. 
To buttress his debating skills he began to read widely in the social sciences. Two books in 
particular were decisively influential: Richard T. Ely's Outlines of Economics (1893) and 
Henry George's Progress and Poverty (1882). By the time he was ready to embark upon a 
university career, he had developed a clear sense of the general direction he intended to take 
in his studies. He would devote himself to becoming a "mathematical social scientist". We 
cannot imagine anyone, not even Kenneth Arrow, other than the Herbert Simon he became, 
encapsulating and wearing this mantle with more grace and justification. 
He obtained his BA in Political Science from Chicago in 1936 and a PhD in 1943. He 
decided to major in Political Science because his first choice of major, Economics, required 
him to take an obligatory course in accounting, which he detested. 
The undergraduate-term paper, written for graduation, led to a research assistantship at the 
Milwaukee City Government in the field of Municipal Administration, which in turn led to a 
Directorship at the Bureau of Public Measurement in the University of California at Berkeley, 
from 1939 to 1942. For Milwaukee he undertook a study of how the municipal employees 
made budget decisions, for example, when deciding between planting trees and hiring a 
recreation director. From this work grew his PhD thesis that, subsequently, became one of the 
fountainheads for the whole field of organisation theory: Administrative Behavior, 
published first in 1946 and still in print.  
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Simon's main intellectual impulses during the Chicago years came from Henry Schultz in 
mathematical economics and econometrics (still in their early years), who was also a mentor, 
from Rudolf Carnap, in the philosophy of science, from Nicholas Rashevsky, in mathematical 
biophysics and from Harold Lasswell and Charles Merriam, in political science. 
Simon observed, when writing an appreciation for his almost lifelong collaborator and co-
Turing prizewinner Allen Newell, that the four great questions of human intellectual 
endeavour are those on the nature of matter, the origins of the universe, the nature of life and 
the  working of the mind. There is little doubt that he himself devoted the whole of his 
professional life to various aspects of the problem of the working of the mind. How does the 
mind perceive the external world? How does perception link up with memory? How does 
memory act as a reservoir of information and knowledge in interacting with the processes that 
are activated in human decision-making, in individual and social settings? In short, human 
problem solving (the title of his 1972 book with Newell): in the face of internal constraints 
emanating from the working of the mind; and constraints, imposed on its workings, by the 
external, perceived, world. 
Much is made these days of ‘ecological rationality’ and ‘ecological cognitive computing’ (cf. 
Vernon Smith, 2008 and Andrew Wells, 2006), by which is meant that any internal 
constraints on the working of the mind should be taken in conjunction with the ‘external 
constraints of the environment’ in which the mind is situated for its interaction with the 
external world. Simon’s definition of Bounded Rationality
3, from the very outset, was to 
encapsulate both of these aspects of the workings of the mind, in its rational, decision 
making, incarnation. This kind of shoddy scholarship, reinventing the square wheel, was even 
‘better’ displayed by the purveyors of current versions of behavioural economics, who 














Nothing and no one in the burgeoning field of modern behavioural economics seem to have 
ever underpinned any of their theories on a model of computation. Thus they are unable to 
comprehend the nature of the decision problem framework, intrinsically framed with an 
underlying algorithmic basis, within which Simon first advanced, and then developed, 
boundely rational and satisficing decisions.  
George Polya's influential little book How to Solve It? (Polya, 1945) introduced generations 
of students to heuristics - the art of guided search. Simon and Newell felt that the Polya 
framework provided a starting point for investigating, experimentally
5, the creative aspects of 
the workings of the mind in two formally and rigorously definable areas - human problem 
solving and in the art of discovery. From lessons that could be learnt in understanding the 
formal aspects of human problem solving they felt they could move on to more ambitious 
tasks: to an understanding of human thinking, in general. From there it would, then, be a 
natural step, even if not an easy one, to a formal understanding of the underpinnings of 
human decision-making in general. 
As for the art of discovery, based on heuristics as guided search, that path led Simon to 
develop  Models of Discovery, resurrecting the Charles Peirce-Norwood Russell Hanson
6 
emphasis on Retroduction (or Abduction; and, thus, circumventing the worn out dichotomy 

























aimed attack on the nihilism in Karl Popper’s stance that there was no scientific basis for a 
‘logic of scientific discovery’ (see, in particular, Simon, 1977, chapter 5.4, & Langley, Simon, 
Bradshaw and Zytkow, 1987). 
Simon was a member of the Cowles Foundation for Economic Research in its early Chicago 
days, before its decisive move to Yale in New Haven; he was also a member of the Rand 
Corporation in its glory days, the early 1950s. The former nurtured, in Simon's own words, 
the econometric "mafia"; the latter fostered the mathematical economics "mafia". To his 
considerable distinction he preserved the courage of his convictions and remained a gadfly 
inside these citadels of orthodoxy whilst enjoying the respect, perhaps even the envy, of his 
distinguished and eminent peers. 
His contributions to formal and traditional economic theory - both to micro and macro 
variants - and to econometric theory were fundamental and path-breaking. At a very early 
stage in the mathematisation of economics he deduced, in joint work with the mathematician 
David Hawkins (Hawkins & Simon, 1949) conditions for stability, which came to be known 
as the Hawkins-Simon conditions in the folklore of the subject, for linear multisectoral 
models of the economy
7. This led to an amusing episode with the House Un-American 
Committee hearings, during the "McCarthy era", because Hawkins - whom Simon had never 
met and with whom he had written the famous paper entirely by correspondence - was a paid-
up member of the Communist Party. 
During the Great Depression Simon had seen a chart on the walls of his father's study, 
tracking the dismal progress of a faltering American economy. This chart was constructed on 
the basis of a model of the macroeconomy and its flows built on the principles of 
servomechanism theory, using hydrodynamic analogies. It had been devised by an 
imaginative engineer, with a doctorate in sociology, A.O. Dahlberg
8. Simon had begun, 













particularly the macroeconomy, from the point of view of the theory of servomechanisms and 
feedback control. This line of research led him to his celebrated results on certainty 
equivalence in the devising of optimal policy in decisions on production scheduling in firms. 
He did not pursue the servomechanism metaphors for too long, because he did not feel that 
they gave additional insights or empirical levers that could not be got by the mathematical 
analysis underlying their structures. He also felt, by then, that analogue simulations were a 
distinct second best to the digital possibilities he was pioneering. 
The origins of the inspiration that led to the influential work with his eminent Japanese 
student Yuji Ijiri on the size distributions of the growth and decay of business firms and 
organisations are narrated with humour and candour in his charming autobiography, Models 
of My Life (1991). It is also a tale of academic bloody-mindedness, recounted without 
rancour, and revisited with nostalgia and regrets on the fallibility of memory. 
In 1946 Richard Goodwin (Goodwin, 1947) had begun his own lifelong research programme 
of interpreting economic agents, markets and the economic system as (nonlinear) oscillators. 
His earliest paper on this subject analysed markets as coupled oscillators with hierarchies of 
coupling strengths: some markets weakly coupled; others strongly coupled. All of them 
linked by economy-wide, common, expenditure impulses. In a remarkable series of papers, 
extending over half a century, Simon exploited this simple idea in all sorts of fertile ways: to 
study causality in economic models; to formalise causality and link it with identifiability in 
econometric models; to theorise about aggregation in economic models; to formalise the idea 
of the hierarchy of complexity utilising near-decomposability in hierarchical organizations
9; 
to study counterfactuals in scientific theorizing, and on using the idea of near-

















In  Models of My Life, he takes this particular example of the inspiration he got from 
Goodwin's remarkable attempt to represent markets interacting with delayed responses as 
hierarchically coupled oscillators to wonder about the kinds of representations scientists use 
in thinking about research problems: where do the metaphors for scientific representations 
come from? How are they represented and retained in the human mind? How are they 
recalled - and when and why at that particular juncture? What are the triggering mechanisms 
and the catalysts? He has answers, tentative, testable and, as always, interesting and 
provocative.  
In his Raffaele Mattioli Lectures of 1993 (published as An Empirically Based 
Microeconomics, 1997), he made the case for study of economies in terms of organisations as 
the basic unit rather than the traditional device of markets. His case is many-pronged and 
based on solid empirical and theoretical results. He felt - but, again, justified by empirical and 
experimental data and results - that the reliance on markets led to the unnecessary and false 
claims for their optimality properties (true only in one of many possible mathematical worlds 
and false in all others) as well as the propagation of the false dichotomy between the virtues 
of decentralisation and the vices of centralisation, without forgetting the merits of the former 
and the disadvantages of the latter. 
But he was optimistic about the future of economics and even more so of computer science 
and the interaction between the two and psychology. In a letter to a former colleague, written 
after reading Velupillai (2000), he wrote that he thought that "the battle has been won, at least 
the first part, although it will take a couple of academic generations to clear the field and get 
some sensible textbooks written and the next generations trained". Much to our regret, we 
feel his optimism was premature. 
Herbert Simon did not accept criticism willingly - not often even gracefully. He felt that he 
had reached his convictions, beliefs and the stands he was taking at any time after deep 
theoretical studies, and seriously and carefully designed experiments to harness empirical 
data to substantiate those theories on which he was betting. The least he expected from his 
critics and detractors was an equal commitment to the scientific enterprise. On the other hand 
he was exceptionally generous to junior colleagues and graduate students - with his time, 
with his advice and with his patronage. He was a passionate liberal and debunked any and  
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every kind of pretence - in scholarship, in manners, in attitude and in interpersonal 
relationships. 
At the time of his death he was the Richard King Mellon Professor of Computer Science and 
Psychology at Carnegie-Mellon University, a post he has held since 1966.  
The precept that may have guided his astonishingly fertile scientific life may well have been, 
in his own words (Simon, 1996, p. 28; italics in the original): 
‘What a person cannot do he or she will not do, no matter how strong the urge to do it.’ 
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The Logic of Discovery, Problem Solving and Retroduction
♠ 
 
“If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then .. 
successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem 
solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we 
reserve the term ‘creative’ for activities like the discovery of the special theory of 
relativity or the composition of Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony, then no example of a 
creative mechanism exists at the present time.” 
 
Newell, Shaw and Simon, 1962 [Simon, 1979, p.145; italics added]. 
 
 
Herbert Simon did not mince his words or his views on Popper’s nihilistic vision for a Logic 
of Scientific Discovery: 
 
“It is unusual for an author, less than one-tenth of the way through his work, to 
disclaim the existence of the subject matter that the title of his treatise announces. Yet 
that is exactly what Karl Popper does in his classic, The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery, announcing [it] in no uncertain terms on p. 31….” 
 
Simon, 1977, p. 326.  
 
Simon countered Popper’s provocative claim that there was no ‘logic of (or ‘to’) scientific 
discovery’, by providing a computational theory of scientific discovery. He did this by 
resurrecting a tradition that came down from Plato’s Meno and Archimedes’s essay on 
Method, through Bernard Bolzano’s Wissenschftslehre and Peirce’s innovative ideas, via 
George Polya’s multifaceted visions and theories of problem solving and Hanson’s Patterns 
of Discovery.  
 
Popper’s Challenge, taken up and resolved - in my opinion decisively - by Simon via his 
Models of Discovery (Simon, 1977, Langley et. al., 1987), was: 
 
“[M]y view of the matter, .. , is that there is no such thing as a logical method of 
having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. My view may be 
expressed by saying that every discovery contains an ‘irrational element’, or ‘a 





♠ Norwood Russell Hanson notes, in Patterns of Discovery (Hanson, 1958, p.85): 
“Aristotle lists the type of inferences. These are deductive, inductive and one other called  [apagoge] 
… Peirce translates is as ‘abduction’ or ‘retroduction’.” 
11 The above paragraph goes on as follows: 
“In a similar way Einstein speaks of the ‘search for those highly universal laws ..  from which a picture 




We have the apparent paradox of Simon, conventionally associated with psychological 
theories of human rational behaviour, in the ‘red corner’, defending the possibility of a 
Logical Theory of Scientific Discovery. In the ‘blue corner’ we find, surprisingly, that 
implacable enemy of all kinds of psychologism, claiming that there can be no logic of 
discovery.  
 
Are these paradoxes? I think not. Simon was the supremely rational artificer; it is just that he 
never forgot to take into account psychological constraints on behaviour. Logic did not 
develop independently of psychology and its mechanisms – except in Vienna in those heady 
interwar years, when the two lived side by side and did not communicate with each other. 
Schlick, Neurath and others, who set the themes that Popper thought he was crucifying, on 
one side; Freud and his followers and patients on all the other sides. Simon’s visions were not 
totally blinded by Carnap, his teacher at Chicago. Like all students who went beyond their 
masters, Simon took the grounding Carnap gave him and turned into a quest for a resurrection 
of that noble tradition of a search for a theory of the logic of discovery that began with Plato’s 
Meno.  
 
Simon noted, in his fascinating collaborative work on Scientific Discovery
12 that: 
 
“A hypothesis that will be central to our inquiry is that the mechanisms of scientific 
discovery are not peculiar to that activity but can be subsumed as special cases of the 
general mechanism of problem solving.” 
 
Langley, et.al, op.cit., p.5; italics added. 
 
Simon came to adopt the problem solving vision – that vision which placed heuristics at the 
center of the process of analyzing discoveries, problems, creativity, experimentation etc. - as 
his scientific credo after the initial impetus garnered from a reading of Polya’s wonderful 
little book, How to Solve It (Polya, 1945)
13. The work that went into Administrative Behavior 
had been completed by the time Polya captivated him. But the way he had approached the 
problems of administering an organization had sown the seeds of a problem solving approach 
to the logic of human decision making in individual, social and organizational contexts. 
Hence the immediate impact and, subsequently, a lifelong commitment to, a problem solving 
approach to behaviour, discovery, hierarchies and much else. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
laws. They can only be reached by intuitions, based upon something like an intellectual love of the 
objects of experience.” 
Clark Glymour, in his commemorative essay in honour of Alan Turing (Glymour, 1966, p.269), noted, with 
admirable irreverence and impeccable accuracy, that: 
For Popper – who quite confused a psychological question with a mathematical issue – it sufficed to 
quote Einstein to disprove the possibility of a discovery algorithm; for Carnap it sufficed to quote 
Popper quoting Einstein.”  
Simon, as noted above, had been Carnap’s pupil in his Chicago student days. 
12 With the unambiguous subtitle (pace Popper!): Computational Explorations of the Creative Process. 
13 In his ‘Biographical Memoir’ on Allen Newell for the National Academy of Sciences, Simon recalled that 
(italics added): 
“Polya’s widely read book, How to Solve It, published in 1945, had introduced many people (including 
me) to heuristic, the art of discovery.”  
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So, what is problem solving? Indeed, what is a problem? In all my own unstructured search 
for a ‘definition’ of this crucial concept I have never found anything to better Polya’s direct, 
intuitively clear and logically impeccable definition:   
 
“[T]o have a problem means: to search consciously for some action appropriate to 
attain a clearly conceived, but not immediately attainable, aim. To solve a problem 
means to find such action.” 
 
Polya, 1981, Vol.1, p.117; italics in original. 
 
‘Action’ is what is usually referred to as a ‘method’, an ‘algorithm’, a ‘mechanism’ to solve a 
problem. Now, I could ask, what other way can we define a method than via a Turing 
Machine? I shall go even further and assert the following, challenging, in the process, the 
ghost of Popper and any of his living acolytes: give me whatever you call a method and I will 
show you that it is either a Turing Machine or, what I shall call, a Constructive Machine. Any 
other device, designed to solve a problem, will have to rely on magic, the mind of God, 
metaphysics or some such appeal to an oracle. 
 
Why don’t I confine the ‘computational explorations of the creative process’ to the Turing 
Machine model? Not because I believe Simon went beyond the Turing Machine model. But 
because Simon enquired, seriously and systematically, whether there was a need, in theory or 
dictated by the actual, observable, activity of the practicing scientist, for a special logic of 
scientific discovery and problem solving. By ‘a special logic’, in his enquiries, he meant, 
whether it was necessary to go beyond the standard logic of the declarative, by appeals to an 
imperative, modal or deontic logic. His answers were emphatically and clearly in the negative 
in every such case (cf., in particular, chapters 3.1, 3.2 and 4.3, in Simon, 1977)
14. His 
conclusion in every such enquiry and examination was that the ordinary declarative logic was 
sufficient and, at most, there was a need to transform a well specified collection of 
imperatives to a declarative form during any action (i.e, implementation of a method to solve 
a problem).  
 
The reason I adjoin Constructive Machines to the Turing Machines as an underpinning for 
Simon’s computational explorations of the creative process is that Kolmogorov showed, in a 
beautiful demonstration, the validity of the following remarkable proposition: 
 
“The calculus of problems is formally identical with the Brouwerian intuitionistic 
logic …| 
 




14 I had myself felt that von Wright’s way of using Deontic Logic was a promising avenue for a theory of 
problem solving and, hence, also human decision making in social contexts. But I had found it almost 
intractably difficult to make the formalisms of Deontic Logic numerically operational via the Turing Machine 
model and was about to give up the endeavour when a reading of Simon pushed me decisively over the edge! As 
Simon pointed out (ibid, ch.3.2, p.154): 
“Approaches to the theory of action have often taken their starting point in the modalities of common 
language: in the meanings of ‘ought’ and ‘must’ and ‘can’. But because common language is complex, 
flexible, and imprecise, travellers on this path have encountered formidable difficulties.” 




“[O]ne should consider the solution of problems as the independent goal of 
mathematics (in addition to the proofs of theoretical propositions).” 
 
ibid, p. 333; italics added. 
 
Kolomogorov did not attempt to define a ‘problem’ or what was entailed in ‘solving a 
problem’ (ibid, p.328; italics in original): 
 
“We do not define what a problem is; rather we explain this by some examples.”
15 
 
Kolmogorov’s examples satisfy Polya’s definition given above. The reason Kolmogorov was 
able to identify Brouwerian Intuitionistic Logic
16 in the formalism of the calculus of problems 
is simple. The formal mathematics that is erected on the foundations of intuitionistc logic is 
some version of constructive mathematics, where there is a special status for existential 
propositions: they must come with a method of constructing the object. Problem solving, as 
Polya has defined it, a definition that Simon embraced, is exactly such an activity: to find in a 
particular set an object with prescribed properties. It is not enough to state that such an object 
exists. This activity of finding is the equivalent of the method of solution, the constructive 
process or the Turing Machine. It is also fundamental and pervasive in Administrative 
Behavior and its subsequent codification in behavioral economics. 
 
Thus, when Simon quite correctly states, at the end of his didactic survey of The Logic of 
Heuristic Decision Making (Simon, 1977, ch.3.2, p.174): 
 
“Our brief survey … demonstrates again the central thesis of this paper: ordinary 
mathematical reasoning, hence the ordinary logic of declarative statements, is all that 
is required..” 
 
But he was like M. Jourdain in Molière’s Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, speaking prose all his 
life without realising it. Simon was a natural practitioner of a constructive mathematics and 
the ‘ordinary logic’ of constructive mathematics could have been given an intuitionistic 
underpinning, if required, but like Errett Bishop, he did not see the need for it – and he was 
absolutely right. Simon simply practised computable or constructive mathematics and neither 
of them requires anything more than a refined and nuanced form of declarative statements for 
their practice to be made numerically operative in the form of algorithms. I would even be 
bold enough to suggest that a careful reading of all the examples of problem solving that 
Simon and his collaborators analyzed would reveal that they did not necessarily accept the 
restrictions of the Church-Turing Thesis. But that is another story.   
 
The examples of the way in which the rules behind discoveries and problem solving are 
learned or revealed should be viewed against a particular backdrop of traditions which were 
                                                            
15 Perhaps Courant (and Robbins) were following in Kolmogorov’s footsteps in their elegant and influential 
book titled What is Mathematics. There is no attempt to define mathematics in this book; the reader is expected 
to infer what it is that may well be mathematics by examples (Courant-Robbins, 1958). 
16 This may be the appropriate place to refer to Popper’s failed attempt at a ‘criticism of Brouwer’s 
epistemology’ (cf. Popper, 1972, pp. 128-140). I have been surprised that serious intuitionistic mathematicians 
have not taken Popper to task for the distortions on, and of, Brouwer that permeate this essay, full of false 
assertions, misleading and out of context references and plain incorrect mathematics.   
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the explicit or implicit settings for much of Simon’s work in these areas. Plato’s Meno, the 
essay on Method by Archimedes, Bolzano’s Theory of Science, the works of Peirce and Polya 
in almost their entirety and Norwood Russell Hanson’s Patterns of Discovery are the 
precursors. They, each of them, provide an impetus or a background for a tradition that 
Simon himself nurtured and refined.  
 
The Socratic dialogue in Meno initiates a noble Western tradition
17 of inquiry into the 
processes of arriving at knowledge and understanding of concepts independently and 
intuitively perceived. The dialogue tries to discover the rule, if any, that may characterize 
concepts in such a way that it will also be recognized as such. In other words, the rule, will 
not only define the concept but also provide a method to assure the inquirer that the 
application of the method will also provide a means to recognize, at its termination, that it 
results in an object with the attributed characteristics
18.    
 
Such a non-standard interpretation puts Simon squarely in a particular Socratic 
epistemological tradition of learning, heuristics and problem solving. Traditionaly, Meno has 
been interpreted to have provided a theory of learning – knowledge as recollection and 
remembering; the paradox of recognizing something one knows, the obliteration of problem 
of problem solving. According to the traditional interpretation, to which Polanyi adheres, 
there is no question of problem solving if one knows - meaning, if one knows that the object 
one is looking for exists - what one is looking for. Neither how one comes to know, nor by 
what means one locates where it exists, is relevant. Simon challenges this interpretation in 
Simon (1977, ch.5.5) and in demonstrating its fallaciousness gives the method that he came 
to adopt, generally, in all problem solving contexts: the model of computational exploration 
of the creative process – the Turing Machine Model. 
 
No careful reading of the relevant parts of Meno could even remotely substantiate Polanyi’s 
interpretations. Just for the record, and to make my case that the Meno supports Simon’s 
interpretations, even of learning as problem solving, I quote from Jowett’s translations 
(Jowett, 1892; the sources used by Simon himself). In perusing the parts of the dialogue 
between Meno and Socrates that I select to quote here, a few pointers might be of use. First of 
all, note that Socrates first castigates Meno for confusing an enumeration with a definition; 
but, then, immediately goes on to define the limit of an enumeration as the definition that is 
sought. This is precisely a case of learning as somewhere between induction – the Gold, 
Putnam view – and retroduction, the Simon view
19. The definition sought for is determined 
                                                            
17 I believe this qualification is essential for a variety of reasons, not least because there are other, equally rich 
traditions of inquiry and epistemology that have equal claim on scholarship. In particular, within my own 
cultural and educational background, Buddhist epistemology provides a rich source of epistemological precepts 
of learning via inquiry dialogues as thought experiments (cf. Jayatilleke, 1963, and the dialogue in the Tamil 
Epic, Manimekalai).  
18 Kolmogorov made this point quite unambiguously (ibid, p.330; second emphasis added; cf also f.n 8 to this 
citation on p.334): 
“If I have solved a logical or a mathematical problem, then I can present this solution in a way that is 
intelligible to all and it is necessary that it be recognized as a correct solution although this necessity 
has to a certain extent an ideal character, for it presupposes a sufficient intelligence on the part of the 
listener.” 
19 Glymour (op.cit, p.271) is the clearest articulation of this view, explicitly within the context of a discussion of 
the place of Plato’s Meno in Western epistemological traditions: 
“The epistemological idea about knowledge in the limit is implicit in many contexts in the twentieth 
century. .. But the articulation of the idea came almost simultaneously in the 1960s from two 
independent sources. Hilary Putnam and E.Mark Gold. It seems likely that Putnam took the idea from  
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by a limit process; without the latter, the knowledge claimed of the thing defined is 
incomplete. Devising a (constructive) limit process defines the object. Thus: 
 
“Socrates: How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you present me 
with a swarm of them, which are in your keeping.  Suppose that I carry on the figure 
of the swarm and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee? And you answer that there 
are many kinds of bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are 
many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some 
other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer me? 
 
Meno: I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees. 
 
Socrates: And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know Meno; tell me what is 
the quality in which they do not differ, but are alike; - would you be able to answer? 
 
Meno: I should. 
 
Socrates: And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, they have 
all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who would answer the 








“Socrates: Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my definition of 
figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends; or more concisely, the limit of 




For Polanyi, on the other hand, we know, tacitly, like Meno, what virtue is. We know what 
we are looking for; hence there is no problem situation. This is a crippled definition of a 
problem. 
 
But it is in that supreme empirical scientist, the true precursor of Simon, Archimedes and his 
practices that one finds the later Epicurean Adventurer’s
21 method articulated most 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Hans Reichenbach and combined it with reflections on Turing’s conventions for output of a computing 
machine.” 
My own views on this problem had been formed before I was motivated to read Meno for the preparation of this 
essay. In Velupillai (2000, chapters 5 & 6) I did advocate Gold’s method and an earlier Putnam vision, that 
which was from his remarkable and almost totally unknown doctoral dissertation written under Reichenbach (cf. 
Putnam, 1951[1990]). I was, unfortunately, totally unaware of the possibilities of the retroductive method at the 
time I was preparing Computable Economics and, hence, relied almost entirely on inductive methods for 
learning and discovery problems.   
20 On this part of the dialogue, Jowett, in his introduction ( p.3; italics added) perceptively observed: 
“Socrates reminds Meno that this is only an enumeration of the virtues and not a definition of the 




persuasively. Archimedes ‘divided and conquered’ when faced with problem solving: ‘first a 
heuristic mechanical method to discover the answer to a problem before looking for a 
demonstration [i.e., proof] of it’ (Crombie, 1994, p.176; italics added). As described in 
Method his strategy of computationally exploring the discovery process was as follows: 
 
“I thought it fit to write out … the peculiarity of a certain method, by which it will be 
possible .. to get a start to enable [one] to investigate some of the problems in 
mathematics by means of mechanics. This procedure is, I am persuaded, no less 
useful even for the proof of the theorems themselves; for certain things first become 
clear .. by a mechanical method, although they had to be demonstrated [proved] by 
geometry [the axiomatic method] afterwards because their investigation by the said 
method did not furnish the actual demonstration [proof]. But it is of course easier, 
when we have previously acquired by the method some knowledge of the questions, 
to supply the proof, than it is to find it without any previous knowledge.” 
 
Quoted in Crombie, op.cit., p.176 
 
Simon elevated this tradition to a new level of rigour and routine, which enabled the 
determined novice to traverse a path towards the status of an expert, so far as discovering 
rules were concerned in a learnable way and, therefore, also a teachable way. This latter 
point, the need to learn and teach methods of inquiry into the nature of knowing concepts, 
was also crucial in the dialogue between Socrates and Meno. 
 
Archimedes felicitously separated the question of discovery from that of proof; the former 
could be done experimentally – both in the classical sense and in the sense of thought 
experiments. For the latter, he used both the technique of proof by reductio ad absurdum and 
ad contradictionem. It was only with the formalism of problem solving that this separation 
was healed. But that had to wait till Brouwer challenged the latter day Platonists in the early 
20
th century, Kolmogorov re-integrated solvability with proof and Church and Turing put it 
all together in one fell swoop as a computational paradigm. 
 
There were many who lit the path between Archimedes and Simon, none more so than that 
father of the Bohemian Enlightenment, Bernard Bolzano. He resurrected the Aristotelian 
triple division of methods of inquiry into induction, deduction and retroduction. The latter as 
the apagogic procedure identical with reductio ad absurdum in the context of what he called 
HEURETIC (cf. Bolzano, 1972, Books Four and Five). This became, in the hands of Polya 
and Simon, heuristics – the art of guided search in a complex space.  
 
One part of Bolzano’s methodology that is reflected in Simon’s practice comes via the 
influence the former had on Polya’s approach to problem solving. The other part of the 
influence, perhaps via Norwood Russell Hanson, was in Simon identifying the logic of 
discovery with the logic of retroduction in his forceful and uncompromising critique of 
Popper’s nihilism regarding the feasibility of a theory and logic of discovery: 
 
“This mystical view [i.e., Popper’s view] towards discovery …. has not gone without 
challenge. Peirce coined the term ‘retroduction’ as a label for the systematic processes 
leading to discovery; while Norwood Hanson, in his Patterns of Discovery, revived 
that term and gave us a careful account of the retroductive path that led Kepler to the 
elliptical orbits of the planets. …   
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Hanson made his case for retroduction by examining historical examples of scientific 
discovery. He did not propose an explicit formal theory of the retroductive process .. 
It is the aim of this paper to clarify the nature of retroduction, and to explain in what 
sense one can speak of a ‘logic of discovery’ or ‘logic of retroduction’. Like Hanson, 
I shall proceed from examples of retroductive processes…” 
 
Simon, 1977, ch. 5.4, pp.326-7. 
 
Bolzano confined his application of the retroductive process, i.e., the apagogic procedure, to 
the mathematical question of ascertaining the truth of a proposition. However, ‘ascertaining 
the truth of a proposition’ was an instance of ‘problem solving’, which is why it entered 
Polya’s scheme of things seamlessly. Bolzano’s criterion for the solution of problems, the 
successful demonstration of a proposition, is predicated upon two requirements, even before 
the thought experiment is conceived: firstly, the proposition to be demonstrated must be 
chosen with care; secondly, it must be tested for its consequences in every conceivable way
22. 
Simon adheres to these two strictures almost religiously and his sustained criticism of 
‘armchair theorizing’ reflects the importance he gives to the second of Bolzano’s criteria for 
the consideration of a proposition as worthy of attention. He goes beyond Bolzano, of course, 
because he goes that extra distance with the testing of propositions: not only as thought 
experiments; but also as components in real experiments. He also goes the extra distance in 
suggesting a theory for the careful selection of the relevant proposition, and that theory, too, 
is computational. 
 
Bolzano’s testing proceeds as follows: 
“If the mere clear representation of a proposition M does not lead to a judgement 
about it, or if this judgement does not appear reliable enough, the next stage in its 
testing is that we attempt to deduce, either from M alone or from M together with 
other already known premises, several consequences and from these further 
consequences, etc. … This procedure of showing the truth of proposition M, and thus 
of solving the indicated problem, is generally called the reduction to absurdity, or 
apagogic procedure. Examples are common in the mathematical sciences…” 
 
  ibid, p.373; first set of italics added. 
 
In concluding my brief attempt at chronicling and exploring Simon’s adventures with the 
logic of discovery in terms of a theory of problem solving, I cannot summarize any more 
succinctly or more cogently that path he took in anything like the elegant way Richard Day 
succeeded in doing it: 
 
“[Simon] was motivated by the view that empirical, systematic, and logically 
consistent theory could enhance effective choice, action, and coordination in ongoing 
human organizations. His commitment to a scientific approach led him to consider the 
nature of scientific methodology, the logical content of causality, the possibility for 
identifying causal structure, and the foundations of human reason itself. [Simon 
espoused] the ancient philosophers’ consilient game of crossing disciplines to create 
unity of knowledge. Moreover, … Simon, as much as any other theorist of his era, 
built his work precisely on a close examination of the basic premises upon which 
                                                            
22 Not in the preposterous Popperian sense of attempts to falsify it.   
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economic theory is built; namely rational choice and the firm. He did this in terms of 
the psychology of individual choice and the social architecture of decision making in 
organizations.” 
 
  Day, 2001, p. 2; italics in original. 
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